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Corruption continues to make the headlines of our
newspapers. For instance, Sheldon Silver, the Speaker
of the New York Assembly, was not only accused of
steering real estate developers to a law firm that paid
him kickbacks, but also for funneling state grants to
a Columbia University doctor who referred asbestos
claims to a second law firm that then paid Silver
referral fees.1 Less than a decade ago, FBI Special
Agent Robert Grant, announcing corruption charges
against then Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich, said
“if [Illinois] isn’t the most corrupt state in the United
States, it is one hell of a competitor.”2 According to
the 2014 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
(ACFE) Report to the Nations global survey of fraud,
36.2 percent of all corruption schemes were found
in government and public administration. Corruption seems to be the most compatible with other
fraud scheme types, and resulted in a median loss
of $200,000 per incident. Further, that 37 percent of
corruption cases were attributed to unusually close
associations with the vendor or customer suggests
conflicts of interest and
corruption.3
Yet those who investigate fraud know
that corruption and
conflicts of interest
are notoriously
difficult to investigate and even
more challenging
to pr os e c ute
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successfully. Beyond the financial and reputational
costs, corruption can change the face of a community.
Consider the assertion: “Over and over, for several
decades, some Chicago aldermen have given away
public benefits, like zoning rights and city-owned
land, to real estate developers who, in turn, have
lined the aldermen’s pockets and campaign purses.”4
Although corruption does significant damage to
public institutions and the private sector, fraud
prevention experts, government accountants and
academics know relatively little about its origins
and causes. There is a dearth of understanding of
why corruption seems rampant and how corruption
actually comes about and ensnares its victims.
Corruption and conflicts of interest, along with
asset misappropriation, and fraudulent statements,
appear in the ACFE “Fraud Tree.” Before turning to
what can be done to mitigate the harmful effects of
corruption, let us first define and understand it, and
recognize the difficulty of detection and the underlying causes of this very human phenomenon.5
The formidable challenge of detecting corruption
is frustrating to law enforcement. For other types of
fraud, victims generally learn of their loss and are
highly motivated to report it, even sue to be made
whole. Conversely, consider the career politician who
develops strong bonds with the vendors that help
put him in office. When that elected official receives
lunches, trips, gratuities, or possibly cash, both parties
are complicit, and therefore neither has an incentive to expose the “other’s” wrongdoing. Corruption,
by its very nature, breeds complicity because even
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Corruption, by its very nature, breeds complicity because
even when one or more parties realizes it is wrong, perhaps
even shameful, the need for discretion and “saving one’s
own skin” imposes secrecy on those involved.

when one or more
parties realizes it
is wrong, perhaps
even shameful, the
need for discretion
and “saving one’s own
skin” imposes secrecy on
those involved.
While direct damages
of public corruption may be
calculable, the secondary effects of
anger and mistrust by the constituents
at large are not only incalculable, they
can actually encourage other participants to engage in this conduct out of
fear of being locked out of the system.
On a larger, societal scale the erosion
of trust among interacting parties
has long-term consequences that
increase transaction costs in markets
and society, as a whole. For instance,
the unsavory activities and reputations of career politicians discourage
many otherwise competent and wellintentioned citizens from ever seeking
political office.
What can be done to stop corruption and conflicts of interest? Is this
malfeasance an inevitable product
of the human condition? First, let’s
examine the causes.

Root Causes: Understanding
the Social Compact of
Reciprocity
For those law enforcement officials who have spent their careers
debriefing corrupt public officials, a
clear pattern becomes evident. While
this information is helpful to assist
investigators gathering evidence
and interviewing participants, and
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it may even be helpful to the judge
sentencing a defendant, this information is rarely shared with entities
that could actually use it to educate
or deter someone from engaging in
corruption.
So what are the root causes of
corruption? What are law enforcement officials seeing that could
actually help prevent corruption?
The simple fact is that corruption is
a human act — something we have all
seen and can understand intuitively.6
“Ethical erosion” is characterized by a
series of small, sometimes unnoticed
acts that erode ethical behavior, with
each act providing a foundation for
even further erosion.7 However, when
the slow, deliberative but nevertheless ethically corrosive process is
happening to the elected official
or corporate executive, they are
unaware of what is taking place, or
may have a misplaced confidence in
their internal, psychological defenses.
In reality, before they realize what is
occurring, it’s too late, the trap has
been sprung, and the unsuspecting
victim has walked right into it.
So what is it? Let’s begin by understanding the relationships between
government or corporate officials
and those trying to obtain influence;
this is best understood as a sales and
persuasion game. The seller of a good
or service, or “lobbyist,” is trying to
obtain influence with the official who
holds power. Whether they know it
by this name or not, those influencepeddlers understand only too well the
underlying principle and sociocultural
construct, i.e., “the social compact of
reciprocity.” Indeed, the most remark-

able aspect
of reciprocity
with its accompanying sense of obligation is its
pervasiveness in human culture.8
Social psychologists and anthropologists have studied the concept
of reciprocity for decades. Indeed,
some scholars have attributed the
very nature of humans to reciprocity.9
They claim humans survived because
our ancestors learned to share goods
and services “in an honored network
of obligation.” Thus, the idea that
humans are indebted to repay gifts
and favors is a unique aspect of
human culture. Cultural anthropologists support this idea in what they
call the “web of indebtedness” where
reciprocity is viewed as an adaptive
mechanism to enhance survival.
Interestingly, there is social pressure exerted on those who receive
but don’t give back; they are disparagingly called “moochers,” “free riders”
or “social loafers.”
Government and corporate officials are decision-makers. They make
purchasing decisions for products and
services, they decide where roads will
be built, they are constantly making
zoning decisions, and they have the
power to expand or contract government services. How can a vendor
influence the decision-makers to
purchase their product or service?
Some of the best information of
how vendors exploit officials has been
learned through their cooperation
with law enforcement. After a plea
agreement, while cooperating with
the government, defendants may
recount their methods and tactics;
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and a common, predictable scenario
gets revealed:
When the politician saw me
coming, he knew he was getting
something. The first encounter
may just be me giving my business card, but I always made sure
his hand was out and I could see
his palm. The next encounter
might be a pen or book, but he
was going to walk away with
something that he knew was
from my firm. This gift- giving
escalates to meals and entertainment. Eventually, the relationship looks more like a friendship
than a business transaction. Trips
to the family home, an outing
to Vegas, or a quick trip on the
corporate jet, it’s all about giving
the official something. What
you’re developing is the ace in
hole. You never know when you
need to call it, but you know it
is there. And when you do call
in your chit, this is when it gets
beautiful. You both know you
just straight-up own him. You
can now ply him with envelopes
of cash and everyone pretends
like nothing is happening.
Those attempting to gain access
will have different modus operandi, but
effectively they all exploit the social
compact of reciprocity. Conversely,
it is enlightening to understand the
thought process of those officials
charged with corruption. Many have
a difficult time admitting they did
anything wrong.
For those officials who pleaded
guilty and cooperated, their story
goes something like this:
I have always done what is
in the best interest of my constituents. I work very hard at this
job and have done a lot of good.
This job is difficult. There are a
lot of campaign rules and I don’t
always pay attention to details.
Sure, people gave me money,
but I assumed it was campaign
contributions. And yes we go
to a lot of dinners, but that’s
how business is done in the real
world. As for the gifts and trips,
it was relatively insignificant and
we always accomplished a lot
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of good on those trips. We may
have met in the political world,
but we are really good friends.
In hindsight, I can see this looks
bad. When my wife asked me
why I always paid in cash and
where was the money coming
from, it finally hit me: I had
somehow sold my office.
Jack Abramoff, arguably the most
corrupt lobbyist in U.S. history, was
the master of this craft until FBI
agents arrested him. At the height
of Abramoff’s corruption machine,
he was giving out an unimaginable
number of skybox tickets, pricey
restaurant meals and golf junkets to
government officials. He even established his own high-end restaurant
near Capitol Hill called “Signatures”
where he regularly treated elected
and appointed federal officials and
their staffers. The ingenuity behind
and efficiency of this setup was that
he could sit at his favorite table and
peddle influence on a large scale.10
The social compact of reciprocity
works in tandem with the slippery
slope principle. The slippery slope
helps explain how one rationalizes
wrongdoing. Fraudsters, or corrupt
public officials, resort to rationalization as the human psyche does not
allow oneself to wake up, look in the
mirror, and see a fraudster looking
back; the fraudster or corrupt public
official inevitably rationalizes his or
her conduct.

When the influence-peddler is
using the social compact of reciprocity to gain influence, the things
of value need to be given incrementally. A vendor handing a briefcase
full of cash to a government official
on the first meeting would likely be
too abrupt, too brazen, and would
neither be expected nor tolerated.
Therefore, the corrupting process is
slow and deliberate. This allows the
official to incrementally rationalize
each gratuity being received. It is like
the proverbial frog in a heated pot: If
you throw the frog into a boiling pot
of water, he will jump out. If you put
the frog in cool water and gradually
turn up the heat, you can cook him
to death. It is the same process with
officials. You have to give the official
time to rationalize each incremental
gift. Once he starts down that slippery slope, speed gathers, and there
is no getting back up the hill. This
“boiled frog” logic explains the nature
and life-cycle of the relationship.
Government entities and mature
corporations have policies in place
to prevent corruption. Government
entities likely have both ethics rules
and criminal statutes that prevent the
receiving of gifts, monetary or otherwise. Corporations typically have a
code of conduct, antifraud policies,
and a conflicts-of-interest policy.
Public officials and company executives know these rules and know they
will be presumed to have known
these rules if caught and challenged.

The human psyche does
not allow oneself to wake
up, look in the mirror, and
see a fraudster looking
back; the fraudster or
corrupt public official
inevitably rationalizes
his or her conduct.
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This is where their rationalization
process is critical. The official needs
to convince himself, as well as justify
to others, that receiving the thing of
value does not violate these rules.
Each incremental gift received must
somehow be explained and rationalized. The official may rationalize that
the gifts are part of a friendship or
that the official is just such a likable
person that people want to bestow
gifts without any expectation of
reward. Regardless of the thought
process, it cannot be viewed as something of value received in their official
capacity because that is a violation
of the rules. Ego trumps common
sense and becomes a fatal blind spot
in such cases.

Prevention and Deterrence
Strategies
Corruption is the most difficult
type of fraud to be detected because
the victims are generally unaware of
its occurrence. Accordingly, prevention has to play a much more prominent role in mitigating harm.
Government officials generally
come into office for the right reasons.
Elected officials resonate with their
peers, their message appeals to their
constituents and they truly want
to bring about positive change.
Appointed officials may also choose
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government service for altruistic
reasons. Officials presumably do not
enter office with the idea of wanting
to profit from bribes. Even corporate
executives who engage in corruption
and take advantage of conflict-ofinterest situations, probably did not
set out to engage in this conduct from
the start.11
The problem with policies is the
lack of implementation by those
charged with governance. Writing a
policy or passing an ethics ordinance
is easy. Creating continued awareness,
instruction, and training of the policies is resource-intensive and costly.
More complicating is the fact that no
official views himself or herself as
corrupt. Whereas those in charge of
governance may fund an ethics awareness program for their organization,
they are also just as likely to find
themselves too busy to attend. Such
an attitude smacks of hypocrisy.
Leaders and management must
strive to model appropriate behaviors,
and thus lead by example in communicating the proper tone from the top.
Their commitment to a strong, fraudresistant culture should be manifest,
and education on fraud and ethics
awareness should be the norm. Codes
of conduct should be regularly revisited and updated, and ethics hotlines
should be emphasized. Swift action
should be taken to deal with ethical
lapses, especially when senior executives are involved because there is
no room for the perception of a
“double-standard” within an
operation. It is important to
create a perception of detection, which can be a most
useful strategy for deterrence and fraud prevention.

Newly appointed officials should be
required to attend a program called
Ethics Awareness for Newly Elected Officials. They should see and hear from
officials-turned-convicted-felons,
including from videos of testimonies, and stories reported in the TV
program, American Greed, etc. These
former officials provide the narrative of how they transitioned from
working for the people to receiving
cash from the people — describing
the “boiled frog” public corruption
syndrome in a detailed fashion with
real-world examples. Former law
enforcement officials also provide
real-world examples based on relative experience.
If such programs are implemented,
an official would have a greater
awareness of constantly being in
the crosshairs of lobbyists and influence-peddlers. They could more fully
appreciate the behaviors of others.
The official could make a conscious
decision to refuse the initial gratuity
and thus nip the corrupting process
in the proverbial bud. In other words,
they could jump out of the “hot water”
before it cooks them.
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